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ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTING PROFESSIONAL 
IDENTITIES 
Cassandra Burke Robertson* 
In recent years, professionals in the military have suffered criticism 
for their failure to counter military excess-especially in the area of torture 
and maltreatment of detainees. Much of the criticism leveled against such 
professionals has assumed that they were bad actors who were making a 
conscious choice to avoid the strictures of their code of ethics. This Article 
counters that narrative by applying identity theory to offer a more situation-
is! explanation. It argues that some of these professional failures arise from 
the cognitive incentives faced by individuals in an organization that re-
wards organizational deference over independent professional advice. Med-
ical, legal, and other professionals in large organizations must deal with 
two competing identities-one tied to their membership in a profession, and 
one tied to their role in supporting the organizational mission. Identity 
themy predicts that when both identities are activated, individuals are more 
likely to act in accordance with the more salient identity. The Article re-
commends that military leaders and other organizational managers create 
Janna! mechanisms to recognize and reward professional competence even 
when professional responsibilities diverge from organizational expediency. 
Such policies may heighten the salience of the professional identity, thereby 
reducing the risk that individuals will subordinate their professional re-
sponsibilities in favor of deference to organizational aims. 
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 604 
II. IDENTITY THEORY ................................................................................ 605 
III. THE PROBLEM OF DUAL PROFESSIONAL IDENTITIES ........................... 609 
IV. COMPETING PROFESSIONAL IDENTITIES IN ORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS 
.............................................................................................................. 611 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT ....................... 617 
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 622 
Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to 
Peter J. Burke, Tiffani N. Darden, Jacqueline D. Lipton, Laura E. McNally, Thomas Robert-
son, and Jan E. Stets for valuable input and comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Por-
tions of the Article are derived my earlier work, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 
CoNN. L. REv. 1 (2009). 
603 
....., 
604 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 43:603 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the United States has called on the professional ex-
pertise of psychologists, doctors, lawyers, and other professionals to assist 
in military operations. In a number of cases, however, a troubling paradox 
emerged: just when the nation most needed to draw on these professionals' 
specialized expertise to limit or counterbalance military excess, a significant 
number of these professionals failed to act in accordance with their profes-
sional code of conduct. Indeed, rather than counterbalancing military 
excess, some of these professionals enhanced and enabled such excesses as 
part of the so-called war on terror. 1 
Critics of the professionals' conduct often attribute their acts to ve-
nality, naked self-interest, and pressure from outside sources,2 while suppor-
ters of the conduct may attribute those same acts to a rational decision-
making process that properly subordinates professional codes to more press-
ing security needs.3 Both of these explanations, however, rely on an as-
sumption that professionals involved in these situations made a conscious 
decision to put expedience ahead of professional conduct, whether for vir-
tuous or venal reasons.4 In a number of cases, however, this assumption 
may not bear out. 
1 See Jonathan H. Marks, Doctors As Pawns? Law And Medical Ethics At Guantimamo 
Bay, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 729 (2007) (acknowledging "revelations of health profes-
sionals' complicity in detainee abuse"); see also HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH'S 
LAWYERS IN THE WAR ONTERROR-237 (2009) (explaining how the attorneys in the Office of 
Legal Counsel within the Department of Justice wrote an opinion about interrogation practic-
es to navigate around legal obstacles which it may not have supported); Peter Margulies, 
True Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Sepa-
ration of Powers, 68 MD. L. REv. 1, 81 (2008) ("Both Yoo's memo on permissible interroga-
tion techniques and Goldsmith's Article 49 memo failed to identify or analyze the possibility 
that interrogation techniques identified as legal would expand into clearly illegal conduct."). 
2 See, e.g., BRUFF, supra note 1, at 239 (arguing that lawyers gave bad advice on interro-
gation as a result of "great pressure to approve practices already in use and to produce intel-
ligence no matter what the cost."); Professor Donald Langevoort coined the term "venality 
hypothesis" to describe this perspective, see Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Law-
yers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. 
REv. 75, 77-78 (1993) ("To pose the question of attorney motivation is to invite a prompt 
answer from many people: greed and moral corruption, of course. Lawyers know of their 
clients' misdeeds, or at best deliberately close their eyes to the evidence, simply to preserve 
their wealth, status and power."). 
3 See, e.g., JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON 
TERROR viii-ix. (2006) (arguing that withdrawal of the infamous torture memo "harmed our 
ability to prevent future al Qaeda attacks by forcing our agents in the field to operate in a 
vacuum of generalizations"). 
4 See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETIDcs 225, 271 (2006) ("Much of this article has proceeded from the presumption that an 
attorney is capable of recognizing her own moral perspective as it bears on her professional 
decision-making."). 
l 
\ 
2011] PROFESSIONAL IDENTITIES 605 
This Article suggests an alternative explanation-one of situation-
ism rather than dispositionism,S arising from the cognitive incentives faced 
by competing professional identities in an organization that rewards organi-
zational deference over independent professional advice. This Article argues 
that professionals involved in the war on terror and its excesses may not 
have perceived-and may still not perceive-any contradiction between 
their actions and their professional code of conduct. Professionals asked to 
provide their expertise to the military were playing two roles; in one role, 
they were responsible for providing objective legal, medical, or psychologi-
cal services, and in the other role they were asked to contribute to the suc-
cess of the military endeavor. Reconciling the two roles is not always easy. 
From an outsider's perspective, these roles may at times appear to 
be in conflict and require the individual to make a choice about which role 
to serve at a particular time. This conflict may not be apparent to those on 
the inside, however. Instead, an individual may be significantly invested in 
the success of both roles, and may have internalized professional identities 
related both to military success and professional service. Because these dual 
professionals' sense of self-identity is linked with success in both spheres, 
they may be unconsciously motivated to try to reconcile the two even in 
situations where a less invested outsider would see only conflict. Moreover, 
these individuals may be cognitively motivated to emphasize the role in 
which their efforts obtain immediate positive feedback--or, in other words, 
to emphasize their organizational identity over their professional identity. 
This Article applies identity theory to help predict when such situa-
tions are likely to arise. Awareness of the social and psychological 
processes at work can help organizational managers understand how best to 
avoid the risks arising from the presence of conflicting professional identi-
ties. Similarly, an awareness of the situational factors influencing behavior 
can help managers shape the situational setting in ways that encourage acti-
vation of the professional identity (thus encouraging independent advice and 
counsel) over the organizational identity, which is more likely to be defe-
rential to existing practices. 
II. IDENTITY THEORY 
Identity theory examines the relationship of the individual to socie-
ty.6 It asserts that individuals defme themselves in part through the groups 
they interact with in society, the roles they take on, and the persons they 
5 See, e.g., Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Diver-
gent Views of Human Behavior are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311 (2008). 
6 See PETER J. BURKE & JAN E. STETS, IDENTITY THEORY 6 (2009); Sheldon Stryker & 
Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future of Identity Theory, 63 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 284, 
284 n.2 (2000). 
··' 
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claim to be-for example, a person may be, at the same time, "a spouse, a 
parent, a teacher, a Southerner, a member of the middle class, and a lead-
er."7 Although individuals will have different ideas about what it means to 
be "middle class" or "a parent," each of these terms still has certain mean-
ings and expectations that are shared within the larger culture. 8 When 
people internalize those cultural meanings and expectations, these roles and 
group memberships are termed "identities," and become "a set of standards 
that guide behavior."9 
Everybody has multiple identities, but not all are actively guiding 
behavior at any one time. Identity theory posits that the identities fit togeth-
er in a hierarchy of "salience," which is defined as the likelihood of a par-
ticular identity's activation. 10 Thus, "the higher the salience of an identity 
relative to other identities incorporated in to the self, the greater the proba-
7 Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
1, 13 (2009); see, e.g., Matthew 0. Hunt, Identities and Inequalities: Exploring Links Be-
tween Self and Stratification Processes, in ADVANCES IN IDENTITY THEORY AND RESEARCH 
76-77 (2003). 
8 Robertson, supra note 7, at 13. Professor David Wilkins has described the formation of 
a "lawyer" identity that has both social meanings and internalized meanings: 
[T]o be a lawyer in the United States is to become a certain kind of person-one 
who sees the world and acts according to normative standards that are distinct from 
those that apply to ordinary citizens. Through a complex system of self-selection, 
professional education, collegial socialization, and the threat of professional discip-
line, lawyers are expected to develop and internalize a distinctive professional 
identity based on the unique norms and practices of their profession. This "role-
differentiated morality"-as both supporters and critics of this standard view of 
lawyering refer to it-is a bedrock principle for all professions but particularly for 
lawyers. 
David B. Wilkins, The New Social Engineers In The Age of Obama: Black Corporate Law-
yers and the Making of the First Black President, 53 How. L.J." 557, 594 (2010); see also 
Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Constntction of Profes-
sional identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1577, 1578 (1993) ("[W]e are reminded at almost every 
tum of the extent to which our identities are social constructions. Indeed, our psyches can be 
viewed as arenas of contention among competing institutions for primacy in forming a par-
ticular conception of the self."); Lynn Mather, Presidential Address: Reflections on the 
Reach of Law (and Society) Post 9/11: An American Szperhero?, 37 LAW & Soc'y REv. 263, 
276-277 (describing the cultural meanings associated with the role of "lawyer" at different 
times: "Law works through its cultural practices and images, as well as through its institu-
tional forms and social processes .... The image of Perry Mason has given way to one of an 
attorney general filing suit on behalf of an entire state or a wealthy plaintiff lawyer filing a 
class action .... "). 
9 Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory, 63 SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY 224, 225 (2000) ("In identity theory, the core of an identity is the 
categorization of the self as an occupant of a role and the incorporation, into the self, of the 
meanings and expectations associated with that role and its performance."); see also BURKE 
& STETS, supra note 6, at 32. 
10 Id. at 229-30. 
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bility of behavioral choices in accord with the expectations attached to that 
identity."11 
Identity formation and salience is influenced by individuals' rela-
tionships. with other people. Identity theory uses the term "commitment" to 
describe "the degree to which persons' relationships to others in their net-
works depend on possessing a particular identity and role," and a higher 
commitment to an identity increases its salience. 12 Thus, "a person with 
close family, friends, or other significant relationships in a shared religion is 
likely to have a more salient religious identity than a person with fewer 
ties."13 Salience, in turn, predicts behavior-so, a person with a more salient 
religious identity is likely to spend more time invblved in religious activi-
ties.14 
Commitment and salience thus reinforce each other. A person with 
strongly religious friends and family has a more salient religious identity, as 
it is reinforced through commitment to those personal connections. The 
salience of the religious identity causes the person to spend more time on 
religious activities-where the person then develops even more social and 
personal connections with others similarly inclined, thus reinforcing com-
mitment. 
These reinforcements are linked through a process termed "self-
verification."15 Self-verification helps individuals maintain a stable set of 
identities.16 Individuals compare their own self-perceptions, or "identity 
standards," to the evaluations of themselves that are made by others. They 
see themselves reflected in the eyes of others, and they compare this reflect-
ed self-assessment to their own ideas of who they are. When the reflected 
feedback matches their own identity standards, they have obtained "self-
verification" and they experience positive emotions. 17 When the reflected 
feedback does not match their identity standards, negative emotions result. 18 
These positive and negative emotions are experienced annually 
among first-year law students, as law students with a strong "student identi-
ty" obtain their first law-school grades. 19 Most law students have achieved 
strong academic success in the past, and have developed a strong identity 
tied to academic success. When some law students obtain lower grades than 
11 Robertson, supra note 7, at 13 (quoting Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 286). 
12 Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 286. 
13 Robertson, supra note 7, at 13 (citing Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 286). 
14 Id. 
15 Stets & Burke, supra note 9 at 232. 
16 Id.; see also Robertson, supra note 7, at 16. 
17 Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 287. 
1s Id. 
19 Robertson, supra note 7, at 17. 
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they are used to, their emotional distress results not just from the lower in-
strumental utility of the grades themselves; instead, it arises from the dis-
connect between identity and reflected assessment. Thus, when a self-
identified "A-level student" receives a Bon an exam, the student may expe-
rience anger, depression, and general distress.20 
When self-verification fails, individuals will try to bridge the gap 
between their situational perception and their identity standard. 21 They may 
do so by changing the situational assessment, such as by "modifying study 
habits in an effort to improve grades in the future," thus attempting to bring 
their external assessment in line with their internal self-perception.22 Alter-
natively, they may bridge the gap by focusing on different aspects of the 
identity to satisfy the assessment; that is, "seeking and creating new situa-
tions in which perceived self-relevant meanings match those of the identity 
standard."23 Thus, a student disappointed with his or her grades may "rede-
fin[ e] academic success to include being at a certain class rank, rather than 
defining success by letter grades alone," or may "identify . . . a particular 
sphere of success, such as moot court or other academic activities. "24 
The reconciliation of identity and reflected assessment can occur 
both consciously and unconsciously. Researchers distinguish between strat-
egies that are "overt/behavioral" and those that are "covert/cognitive."25 
Overt strategies are those that individuals consciously undertake-for ex-
ample, an attorney with a strong "conservative" identity may choose to at-
tend Federalist Society meetings, or a doctor with a strong "service" identity 
may choose to volunteer with an organization such as Doctors Without Bor-
ders. In both cases, the individuals are intentionally associating with larger 
groups that reflect and share the individual's identity, thus increasing the 
opportunities for self-verification. 
Covert strategies, however, operate at an unconscious level. In or-
der to avoid the emotional distress that comes from a lack of self-
verification, the individual may engage in selective attention ("self-
verifying information is given attention and processed, and information that 
is not self-conflTlling is ignored") and selective interpretation ("endorsing 
feedback that fits self-views and denying feedback that does not fit self-
views").26 In cases when "self-discrepant feedback is unavoidable," re-
20 Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 288. 
21 Robertson, supra note 7, at 17 (citing Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 288). 
22 Robertson, supra note 7, at 17. 
23 Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 288. 
24 Robertson, supra note 7, at 17 (citing Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 288). 
25 Jan E. Stets & Alicia D. Cast, Resources and Identity Verification from an Identity 
Theory Perspective, 50 Soc. PERSP. 517, 522 (2007). 
26 Id. at 522. 
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searchers have found that "people may construct the illusion of self-
confirming worlds by 'seeing' more support for their self-views than actual-
ly exists.'m Thus, "people with positive self-views will spend more time 
scrutinizing favorable feedback than unfavorable feedback, and after under-
going an evaluation they will remember more favorable statements than 
unfavorable statements."28 
III. THE PROBLEM OF DUAL PROFESSIONAL IDENTITIES 
Covert/cognitive strategies for self-verification may also provide a 
way to resolve conflicting professional identities. Conflicting professional 
identities may arise when the same person plays two different roles within 
an organization. For example, an attorney who serves as in-house counsel 
may have an "organizational" professional identity as an employee of the 
corporation as well as an "advisor" identity as an attorney providing neutral 
advice to the corporation.29 Likewise, government attorneys may similarly 
have a "policymaker" identity in addition to the "advisor" identity.30 
While everyone has multiple identities that may be activated in dif-
ferent situations (for example a "parent" identity may be activated at differ-
ent times than a "doctor" identity), some situations will activate more than 
one identity at a time. When this happens, identity theory predicts that "the 
identity with the higher level of prominence or the identity with the higher 
level of commitment will guide behavior more than an identity with a lower 
f . . ,3] level o prommence or comnntment. 
The same situation arises when an individual possesses two or more 
professional identities that are likely to be activated at the same time. A 
27 William B. Swann, Jr., The Trouble With Change: Self-Verification and Allegiance to 
the Self, 8 PsYCH. SCI. 177, 178 (1997). 
28 Robertson, supra note 7, at 18 (citing William B. Swann, Jr., The Trouble with Change: 
Self-Verification and Allegiance to the Self, 8 PSYCH. SCI. 177, 178 (1997)). 
29 Robertson, supra note 7, at 14; Hugh Gunz & Sally Gunz, Hired Professional to Hired 
Gun: An Identity Theory Approach to Understanding the Ethical Behaviour of Professionals 
in Non-Professional Organizations, 60 HUM. REL. 851, 854-59 (2007). 
30 See Robertson, supra note 7, at 26. 
31 PETER J. BURKE & JAN E. STETS, IDENTITY THEORY 133 (2009). The problem of conflict 
between two identities is not a new one. When women first entered the legal profession, 
some experienced role conflict between their identities as suffragists and as lawyers. See 
Renee Newman Knake, The Progress Of Women In The Legal Profession, 29 PACE L. REv. 
293, 300-01 (2009) ("[W]hile women lawyers and suffrage activists were 'closely connected 
immediately after the Civil War, they increasingly diverged in the latter decades of the nine-
teenth century; indeed, it seems that a number of successful women lawyers gradually 
adopted a professional identity as lawyers, one that increasingly distanced them from other 
women activists,' thus establishing a troubling dichotomy for women lawyers that persists 
today.") (quoting MARY JANE MOSSMAN, THE FIRST WOMEN LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE 
STIJDY OF GENDER, LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS 41 (2006)). 
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major study of in-house counsel found that the relative salience ofthe attor-
ney's two identities influenced behavior in responding to dilemmas of pro-
fessional ethics.32 It also suggested that these attorneys were unaware that 
.identity salience was influencing their choices, thus potentially avoiding the 
"identity dissonance" that people may experience when there is "conflict 
between irreconcilable aspects of their self-concepts."33 In the study, in-
house attorneys were asked to respond to a series of ethical vignettes. 34 The 
scenarios presented situations in which compliance with the attorney's pro-
fessional obligations would require actions that would be inconsistent with 
corporate managers' preferred course of action: for example, the attorney 
would have to decide whether to report a CEO's misconduct to the corpora-
tion's board of directors. 
The relative salience of the conflicting identities affected reported 
behavior:35 "[a]ttorneys who identified more strongly as employees were 
statistically more likely to choose the more organizationally deferential op-
tions in the vignettes, and those who identified more strongly as 'lawyers 
with a captive client' were more likely to choose the more professionally 
oriented option."36 Thus, the researchers concluded that the salience oflaw-
yer identity in fact shapes ethical behavior.37 
In tum, the time spent in each role and the connections developed in 
that role similarly influenced the salience of each of the two identities. The 
researchers reported a correlation between the amount of time spent on ac-
tivities, such as business planning, management, and administration, and the 
salience of the "organizational" or "employee" identity.38 
The study suggested that the effects ofidentity salience on attorney 
behavior happened at an unconscious level. There was no suggestion that 
in-house counsel recognized their professional obligations but felt con-
strained by organizational pressure to avoid them. Indeed, the survey vig-
nettes did not ask not what the attorney would do, but asked instead what 
the attorney should do.39 When attorneys answered these questions in ways 
that differed from their professional obligations, they were not making a 
rational decision to avoid compliance with professional norms; instead, they 
were failing to recognize that professional norms called for a different an-
swer than the one they provided. 
32 Gunz & Gunz, supra note 29, at 886. 
33 Carrie Yang Costello, Changing Clothes: Gender Inequality and Professional Socializa-
tion, 16 NAT'L WOMEN'S STUD. ASSN. J. 138, 140 (2004). 
34 Robertson, supra note 7, at 14-15 (citing Gunz & Gunz, supra note 29, at 861--63). 
35 Gunz & Gunz, supra note 29, at 871. 
36 Robertson, supra note 7, at 15 (quoting Gunz & Gunz, supra note 29, at 864, 868-71). 
37 Id. 
38 Id (citing Gunz & Gunz, supra note 29, at 868-871). 
39 Id. at 15-16 (citing Gunz & Gunz, supra note 29, at 882-86). 
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The survey results therefore suggest that at least in some cases, the 
problem is not merely one of moral courage-instead, it appears that at least 
in certain conditions, professionals may truly fail to recognize the "profes-
sionally correct" course of action. The individuals in the study were un-
consciously "control[ling] situational meanings to make them more congru-
ent with the meanings held in all of the identity standards."40 By uncons-
ciously engaging in selective perception and selection attention, the attor-
neys in the study were able to avoid contemplation of the disconnect be:.. 
tween their chosen course of conduct and their professional responsibili-
ties-and were thus able to avoid the emotional distress that would accom-
pany the failed self-verification of either of their competing professional 
identities. 
IV. COMPETING PROFESSIONAL IDENTITIES IN ORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS 
Competition between two professional identities leads to a paradox: 
an individual hired to provide independent expertise within an organization 
becomes increasingly less able to provide that independent expertise as he 
or she becomes increasingly more integrated into the organization. As time 
is spent on organizational activities and relationships are forged with orga-
nizational colleagues, the individual's organizational identity gains salience 
and becomes more likely to influence behavior and decision-making-
sometimes even to the point that the individual loses sight of professional 
obligations that may conflict with organizational goals. In earlier articles, I 
have argued that this phenomenon may explain, at least in part, why attor-
neys involved in the development of the torture memos did not see how 
those memos conflicted with legal ethics obligations that appeared clear to 
outsiders.41 
The phenomenon may also be at work in other situations in which 
professionals participate in larger organizations, including-but not limited 
to-military operations. As those professionals take on a larger role in the 
organization, they may be correspondingly less able to provide independent 
expertise. In some cases, the highest-level individuals empowered to act for 
the organization may value independent professional judgment, but lower-
40 BURKE & STETS, supra note 6, at 134. 
41 Robertson, supra note 7, at 22-29; see also Cassandra Burke Robertson, Beyond the 
Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural Commitments, and Partisan Identity, 42 CASE 
W. REs. J. INT'L L. 389 (2009); see also Peter Margulies, Reforming Lawyers into Irrelev-
ance? Reconciling Crisis and Constraint at the Office of Legal Counsel, available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=1788349 (March 20, 2011) ("The [Office of Legal Counsel] lawyer 
must always consider how other stakeholders, including Congress and the courts, will view 
executive initiatives .... An OLC lawyer who too readily buys into the President's initiatives 
will cannibalize her own credibility, and eventually leave the President without the imprima-
tur that OLC can provide."). 
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level managers in the organization may not value such independence. Indi-
viduals within the organization may instead merely desire professional cov-
er, as when military officials ask medical professionals to supervise and 
approve questionable interrogation techniques that may rise to the level of 
torture.42 In other cases, organizational managers may desire independent 
advice, but the organization itself may be structured in such a way that pro-
fessional independence is neither encouraged nor rewarded. In either case, 
the very skills and judgment for which the professional is hired may be sub-
ordinated in order to achieve self-verification of the organizational identi-
ty-specifically, in the armed forces context, by achieving recognized suc-
cess in the military endeavor. 
Subordinating a conflicting professional identity in military opera-
tions may lead to significant problems. These problems are not unique to 
military operations led by the United States, but are instead an institutional 
problem among military forces worldwide-and are a subset of organiza-
tional challenges more generally. Medical professionals in particular have 
been involved in a variety of military operations that have led to a signifi-
cant number of alleged conflicts between professional obligations and oper-
ational expediency. Scholars have found instances of such conflicts among 
"South African military medical personnel [who] develop[ed] chemical and 
biological weapons against opponents of the apartheid regime," "military 
doctors stationed in Namibia during the apartheid era ... [who] limited care 
to local civilian populations in the occupied territory," Russian physicians 
"working under the supervision of military officials to help secure the re-
quired quota of draftees [who] subordinated their medical judgment by neg-
lecting to register severe illnesses in conscripts they examined, resulting in 
numerous fatalities among the soldiers," "Dutch military doctors in the for-
mer Yugoslavia [who] did not provide critical medical care for civilians 
under siege in Srebrenica in 1995," and "American military physicians 
[who] were alleged to have failed to maintain adequate medical records to 
protect detainees' health or ensure their access to medical care at the Abu 
Ghraib prison in Iraq."43 
Other professional failures-especially those related the so-called 
"War on Terror"-have been well documented.44 The problem is heightene,d 
when multiple professionals from multiple disciplines fail to check military 
42 See Kevin Michael Bond, Physician as Military Officer: Conflicts in Professional Duties 
(Aug. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee), available at 
http:/ /trace.tennessee.edu/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= I 042&context=utk _graddiss. 
43 Leslie London et al., Dual Loyalty among Military Health Professionals: Human Rights 
and Ethics in Times of Armed Conflict, I5 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 38I, 383 
(2006) (citing Steven H. Miles, Abu Ghraib: Its Legacy for Military Medicine, 364 LANCET 
725, 728 (2004)). 
44 See, e.g., Marks, supra note I; BRUFF, supra note I; Margulies, supra note 1. 
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excess, as happened in the case of the tortured detainees, where doctors, 
psychologists, and lawyers all failed in some respect. Medical doctors 
watched interrogations behind glass, offering assessments of whether detai-
nees were "fit" for interrogation; because they believed they were not acting 
in the role of a treating physician while offering this advice, they considered 
themselves not to be bound by patient-centered medical ethics.45 Psycholo-
gists also assisted in interrogation; complaints have been lodged against 
some mental-health professionals who are accused of developing the "en-
hanced interrogation" programs that included sexual humiliation and other 
psychological stressors.46 
The medical and mental health professionals were not alone in fall-
ing short in this area. Government lawyers failed to caution against the ille-
gality of proposed interrogation methods.47 Onlookers noted that some of 
the lawyers involved interrogation activities at Guantanamo seemed to have 
been "immersed" in operational policy and "drank the Kool-Aid."48 One of 
those lawyers, Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver, refused to admit her legal 
advice in authorizing waterboarding ran contrary to established law-but 
she nonetheless defended her actions by relying on the importance of the 
operational mission: 
If my legal opinion was wrong, then I regret the error very much. I am a 
proud professional. I feel very keenly any failure on my part to be precise 
and accurate in the advice I render. I freely accept sincere dissent and criti-
cism. But there is something very important I will never have to regret. At 
45 M. Gregg Bloche & Jonathan H. Marks, When Doctors Go to War, 352 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 3 (2006). 
46 Morgan Smith, Psychologist in Terror War Is Subject of Complaint, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 
13, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ll/14/us/14ttlawsuit.html. 
A complaint against Dr. James E. Mitchell is now before the Texas State Board of 
Psychologists, alleging that he violated the profession's rules of practice in helping 
the C.I.A. develop 'enhanced interrogation tech.illques' for use in its so-called 
black prison sites .... Dr. Mitchell ... parlayed his experience in training Ameri-
can soldiers to survive as prisoners of war into a lucrative consulting business with 
the C.I.A. He orchestrated - and, according to the complaint, participated in - the 
harsh interrogation of terror suspects using sexual humiliation and the drowning 
technique called waterboarding. 
47 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE Tiffi BUSH 
ADMlNISTRATION 165 (2007) ("How could OLC have written opinions that, when revealed to 
the world weeks after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, made it seem as though the administra-
tion was giving official sanction to torture .... How could its opinions reflect such bad 
judgment, be so poorly reasoned, and have such terrible tone?"). 
48 See, e.g., PHILLIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND Tiffi BETRAYAL OF 
AMERICAN VALUES 126 (2008) (describing Michael Gelles's view of Diane Beaver's role in 
authorizing waterboarding and other acts at Guantanamo). 
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a time of great stress and danger, I tried to do everything. in my lawful 
power to protect the American people.49 
Even military chaplains were subject to competing demands in their 
roles as both military officers and religious leaders. At Guantanamo, Mus-
lim chaplains provided religious assistance to detainees. 50 Unlike the medi-
cal and legal professionals who were too deferential to military expediency, 
the chaplains appeared to maintain their independence and comply with 
their professional obligations. But they suffered for this independence with-
in the organization; from the beginning, some military members were suspi-
cious of the Muslim chaplains who "were fervent in their beliefs and en-
couraged other Muslims to participate in their religious activities," especial-
ly as military personnel noticed that "[a] lot of their religious beliefs mir-
rored those of the detainees. "51 As a result, accusations were frequently le~ 
veled against the chaplains. Brigidier General Rick Baccus stated that 
"[ e ]very one of the chaplains was accused of something while I was 
there. "52 He noted that the chaplains "were always under suspicion by the 
interrogators, because they were interacting with the detainees and giving 
them Korans ... [The Military Police] just didn't like the chaplains going 
around talking to the detainees. "53 
The provision of these religious services was criticized by some in 
the military who argued that detainees should be expected to freely exercise 
their religions on their own-without religious support from military chap-
lains. 54 One military report argued not only that chaplain services were not 
needed for the detainees, but that military operations needed to rely more on 
chaplaincy services to promote U.S. servicemember morale-and, tellingly, 
49 Hearing Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., llOth Cong. 55 (2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/061708beaver.pdf (statement of Diane E. Beaver, 
Lieutenant Colonel (ret.), U.S. Army; Former Staff Judge Advocate, Guantanamo Bay). 
50 James Yee; the most well-known Muslim chaplain who served at Guantanamo, was at 
one point himself arrested on suspicion of aiding terrorist activity. All charges were later 
dropped. Dave Mazza, James Yee: An Unlikely Enemy of the State, PORTLAND ALLIANCE, 
Jan. 8, 2006. 
51 Tim Golden, How Dubious Evidence Spurred Relentless Guantimamo Spy Hunt, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at 28. 
52 !d. 
53 !d. 
54 See ROBERT T. WILLIAMS, THE COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DELIVERY OF 
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT TO THE DETAINEES IN THE JOA: ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS NEEDS 
BALANCED WITH NECESSARY SECURITY CONCERNS 17 (Naval War College 2006) available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc? AD=ADA463665&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.p 
df (recommending various policies for chaplain services, and arguing that "(r]eligious sup-
port to detainees is best defined as complete latitude in the exercise of religious duties con-
sistent with the requirements of detention," and that "[t]he role of the chaplain is to provide 
religious support to authorized personnel"). 
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to report instances of low morale among U.S. troops to military command-
ers.55 These pressures create a classic conflict in professional roles. In the 
role of religious leader, the chaplain would provide advice and counsel to 
those who seek it. In the role of military officer, however, they would pro-
vide advice to military commanders about how best to manage and promote 
troop morale. 
The fact that the chaplains were able to maintain their professional 
commitments in the face of such criticism suggests that they obtained sup-
port in their professional role that the other professionals did not. In part, 
this may be due to the shared religious identity that was joined with the mil-
itary-chaplain identity. And, while there is no current allegation that the 
chaplains breached their obligations to the military, the number of accusa-
tions of such misconduct-including the arrest and subsequent release of 
Chaplain James Yee56-suggests that the chaplains did not fmd it comforta-
ble to balance professional obligations with military responsibility, and that 
the organization did not make it easy for them to do so. 
Some scholars have criticized viewing such conflicts in terms of 
"dualloyalties."57 And certainly, when professionals have consciously cho-
sen to set aside professional ethics in favor of organizational expedience, 
this view has merit. The military does not require-and should not re-
quire-abandonment of professional codes of ethics. The more difficult 
situation, however, is when medical, legal, or other professionals do not 
consciously set aside their ethical obligations but rather unconsciously avoid 
or overlook them. In many of the conflict scenarios outlined above, it is 
unlikely that the professionals were consciously aware of the conflict in 
their behavior. Instead, it is more likely that they were cognitively moti-
vated to pay attention only to the facts and circumstances related to their 
most salient professional identity-here, their organizational/military identi-
ty. 
While it may seem unlikely that a professional could simply not 
"see" the conflict with professional values in the situations above, cognitive 
motivations are strong forces. All human beings filter information, and must 
do so in order to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information-
without such filtering, people would hear "background noise as loudly as 
voice or music" and would be unable to enjoy a symphony or to focus on 
55 Id. at 16 ("The chaplain's active involvement in advising the commander on the perfor-
mance, morale, and status of the troops might have made the difference [to the events of Abu 
Ghraib]." 
56 See supra note 51. 
57 
See, e.g., George J. Annas, Military Medical Ethics-Physician First, Last, Always, 359 
N. ENGLAND J. MEn. 1087 (2008) ("[T]hese conflicts are not captured by oversimplified 
expressions such as "mixed agency" or "dual loyalty." ... The "physician fusf' guidance is 
only half the story; the other half should be "last and always."). 
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partners in a conversation. 58 At an unconscious level, the human brain there-
fore devotes more attention to information deemed "relevant. "59 A crime 
witness, therefore, may recall more about the weapon used than about the 
perpetrator's physical characteristics-in the heat of the event, the victim's 
mind has picked the weapon out as the most immediately relevant threat. 60 
But filtering is not without inherent bias; the same cognitive 
processes that defme "relevance" will draw on the individual's preexisting 
beliefs or desires in order to make that calculation.61 As a result, people's 
attention is drawn to events that mesh with their expectations and beliefs-
and information that counters those beliefs may be unconsciously disre-
garded. This process was first documented years ago in a study of football. 62 
Researchers showed a film of a rowdy Princeton/Dartmouth game to stu-
dents and alumni of both schools, and they asked the viewers to count the 
number of rule infractions by each team, to rate those infractions as "fla-
grant" or "mild," and to determine which team started the "rough play."63 
As might be expected, Princeton supporters perceived different 
events than did the Dartmouth supporters. Each group viewed the "facts" of 
the game differently, paying selective attention to the facts favorable to their 
team. The Princeton group recorded twice as many Dartmouth rule infrac-
tions as Princeton ones and judged the Dartmouth rule infractions to be 
more often flagrant than Princeton's infractions.64 Eighty-six percent of the 
Princeton group believed that the Dartmouth team started the rough play.65 
By contrast, the Dartmouth group recorded nearly equal numbers of rule 
infractions between the two teams and believed that fewer of their team's 
infractions were "flagrant."66 Nor did they agree that their team had started 
58 William H. Starbuck & Frances J. Milliken, Executives' Perceptual Filters: What They 
Notice and How They· Make Sense, in THE EXECUTIVE EFFECT 35, 40 (Donald C. Hambrick 
ed., 1988); see also SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAraNa 21 
(1993) ("Perceptions are, by their very nature, selective."). 
59 Starbuck & Milliken, supra note 57. 
6° Fredrik H. Leinfelt, Descriptive Eyewitness Testimony: The Influence of Emotionality, 
Racial Identification, Question Style, and Selective Perception, 29 CRIM. JUST. REv. 317, 322 
(2004). 
61 Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL 
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954); see also Starbuck & Milliken, supra note 58, at 40. 
62 Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 60, at 130. 
63 !d. 
64 !d. at 131-32. 
65 Id at 131. 
66 Id 
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the rough play-a majority (fifty-three percent) of the Dartmouth group 
stated that "both teams" started the rough play. 67 
The results suggested that the different perceptions occurred at an 
unconscious level-neither group of participants was aware that they were 
missing their own team's infractions. In fact, one Dartmouth fan, having 
heard of his team's numerous infractions from a Princeton friend, thought 
that he must be missing the part of the film containing these offenses. He 
sent a telegram to the researchers: "Preview of Princeton movies indicates 
considerable cutting of important part please wire explanation and possibly 
air mail missing part before showing scheduled for January 25 we have 
splicing equipment."68 Even though they watched the same film, study par-
ticipants saw two very different games. Researchers concluded from the 
study that "[t]here is no such 'thing' as a 'game' existing 'out there' in its 
own right which people merely 'observe.' The game '"exists' for a person 
and is experienced by him only in so far as certain happenings have signi-
ficances in terms ofhis purpose."69 
Military operations are not a football game. But they lend them-
selves, perhaps even more than a game, to selective perception. 70 The fast 
pace of action, the stress and fear inherent in the operation, and the impor-
tance of the stakes mean that there are many demands for the attention of 
participants. Just as the crime victim is likely to best perceive the most im-
mediate threat-the weapon-'--so too are professionals in the military likely 
to focus their attention on the threats perceived to be the most relevant. Un-
der these conditions, it may not be surprising that they do not recognize 
conflicts that appear obvious to the outsider evaluating military conduct 
from a safe distance of time and space. 
V .. IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT 
Organizational managers responsible for securing independent pro-
fessional advice for the larger organization face a significant challenge. 
They cannot rely on traditional carrot-and-stick incentives to ensure com-
pliance with professional norms. The threat of professional sanctions or 
67 Id By way of comparison, "[t]he official statistics of the game, which Princeton won, 
showed that Dartmouth was penalized 70 yards, Princeton 25, not counting more than a few 
plays in which both sides were penalized." /d. at 129. 
68 /d. at 132. 
69 /d. 
70 Indeed, similar effects of selective perception and selective interpretation have been 
replicated in a number of modem studies since the original Princeton/Dartmouth study. See, 
e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., 'They Saw a Protest': Cognitive flliberalism and the Speech-
Conduct Distinction, (Cultural Cognition Project Working Paper No. 63), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=l755706 (February 5, 2011); Leigh Thompson, "They Saw a Nego-
tiation": Partisanship and Involvement, 68 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 839 (1995). 
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even criminal prosecution cannot influence the behavior of an individual 
who simply fails to see that his or her behavior fails to comport with profes-
sional obligations. And at least in some cases, it appears that individuals 
with dual professional identities may unconsciously subordinate the respon-
sibilities of their independent professional identity in favor of the organiza-
tional identity, as the organizational identity is more strongly supported in 
the workplace and therefore gains salience over the less-supported profes-
sional identity. 
This is not to suggest that professional sanctions are inappropriate 
in such instances. When professional duties are breached, the profession's 
licensing body should and must take disciplinary action. Such action is not 
merely retributive or coercive, but instead defines the standards of the pro-
fession and sets a baseline of expectation for individuals to follow. 71 Such 
sanctions make a very public statement that certain conduct is inconsistent 
with professional duties. 72 
Nonetheless, sanctions alone are insufficient. The lessons to be 
learned from identity theory's application to dual professionals in an orga-
nizational setting suggest that, by themselves, the threat of such sanctions 
cannot ensure compliance with professional standards. By their nature, 
sanctions allow only post-hoc identification of misconduct. Organizational 
managers, however, must try to ensure compliance ex ante. 73 And because 
of the cognitive incentives- at work, professionals may unconsciously over-
look professional responsibilities in favor of adopting positions more defe-
rential to short-term organizational goals. 
Recognizing the unconscious situational incentives affecting dual 
professionals does not excuse the failure to comply with professional stan-
dards. But such recognition can help managers move forward in searching 
for strategies to minimize and prevent both the likelihood and the impact of 
such failures in the future. 74 
71 See MarkS. Frankel, Professional Codes: Why, How, And With What Impact?, 8 J. Bus. 
ETHICS 109, 110 (1989) ("A profession's code of ethics is perhaps its most visible and expli-
cit enunciation of its professional norms. A code embodies the collective conscience of a 
profession and is testimony to the groups recognition of its moral dimension."). 
72 !d. at Ill ("As a visible pronouncement of a profession's self-proclaimed role and 
values, a code can function as a basis for the public's expectations and evaluation of profes-
sional performance .... "). 
73 See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IsSUES 123, 123 
(2003). 
74 Scholars looking at other organizational contexts have noted that the organizational· 
setting can either promote or discourage professional independence. See, e.g., Norman W. 
Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the Department of Justice, 63 STAN. L. 
REv. 409, 446 (2011) (advocating "reforms that would provide structural support for the 
lawyer's prohibition when political accountability cannot effectively check an administra-
tion's extralegal action," such as transparency, a move away from "partisanship for those 
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Specifically, managers can do two things to reduce the likelihood of 
such failures. First, they can structure situational influences in ways that 
provide support for-and thereby increase the salience of-individuals' 
professional identity in relation to their organizational identity. Second, 
managers can create situational opportunities for individuals to obtain self-
verification of their professional identity without sacrificing organizational 
status. 
As noted above, the more salient an identity is within the hierarchy 
of personal identities, the more likely it is that that identity will guide indi-
vidual behavior. Thus, if the situation can be structured to increase the sa-
lience of the individual's professional identity, then the individual will be 
more likely to perceive-and to pay attention to-professional obligations 
that may conflict with short-term organizational goals. And, indeed, there is 
evidence of situational influence in this area; research suggests that "the 
identity hierarchy gets slightly re-ordered within a situation as the situation 
triggers the salience of some identities over others."75 In a simiarlar vein, 
other research suggests that an identity can be "primed" through reflection 
to achieve increased salience in a given situation, making it more likely that 
the identity will be activated.76 For example, writing and describing the 
words "caring," "compassionate," "kind" and related terms worked to prime 
a moral identity.77 Study participants in the primed condition were more 
likely to report negative emotions after reading a news story about the mi-
streatment of Iraqi prisoners and were less likely to express moral disen-
gagement. 78 
Professionals in organizational settings can adopt-and managers 
can encourage the organization itself to adopt-strategies that will reinforce 
the professional identity.79 Interacting with others in a professional capacity 
may have such an effect, as professionals share expectations and discuss the 
medical, legal, or other ramifications of a particular issue. Such conversa-
providing secret advice," "strategically decentralized sources of advice for controversial, 
covert actions, and prompt professional investigation and sanction (or reduced barriers to 
civil liability)."). 
75 Jan E. Stets, Michael J. Carter & Jesse Fletcher, Moral Agency and Emotions: A Con-
trol Systems Approach (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) at 32-33. 
76 Karl Aquinoa, Americus Reed, Stefan Thauc, and Dan Freeman, A Grotesque and Dark 
Beauty: How Moral Identity And Mechanisms OJ Moral Disengagement Influence Cognitive 
And Emotional Reactions To War, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCH. 385 (2007). 
77 I d. at 390. 
78 Id. 
79 See also Peter Margulies, Lawyers' Independence and Collective fllegality in Govern-
ment and Corporate Misconduct, Terrorism, and Organized Crime, 58 RUTGERS L. REv. 939, 
941 (2006) (noting that lawyers' "distinctive professional identit[ies]"-or "brands"-can 
serve a valid role in the pursuit of their clients' goals, but can also conflict with lawyers' 
gatekeeping role, and arguing that lawyers "must balance branding with gatekeeping"). 
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tions may increase the salience of the professional identity relative to the 
organizational identity. 
Organizational managers should make sure that professionals have 
the opportunity to communicate and network with other professionals-
both in and out of the organizational context. Thus, it would be helpful to 
schedule regular meetings for groups of attorneys, doctors, psychologists, or 
religious leaders. At these meetings, professionals could discuss questions 
and issues as they arise. Given their common background of expertise, pro-
fessionals in the same area are likely to be able to offer helpful advice re-
garding thorny issues. 
The main benefit of such meetings may not be the professional dis-
cussion, however, but may rather be the professional socialization. 80 Simply 
meeting in a group of others with a shared profession-even in the absence 
of"shop talk"-may be sufficient to prime the group members' professional 
identity. In identity theory terms, spending time with others in the profes-
sion may increase commitment to that professional identity-thereby rais-
ing its salience in the identity hierarchy, and making it more likely that the 
professional identity will guide behavior in situations where both the pro-
fessional identity and the organizational identity may both be activated. 
Other strategies would focus not just on re-ordering the situational 
salience of professional identity, but would increase opportunities for self-
verification of the professional identity. Increasing such verification oppor-
tunities would reduce the risk that individuals will fall prey to cognitive 
pressure to remain blind to conflicts between professional values and orga-
nizational expediency. If the organization appears to reward and value only 
actions that meet short-term goals, then individuals will be more likely to 
selectively focus on the most immediately compelling organizational 
needs-and, like the study participants who watched the football game, or 
like the crime victim facing a weapon, they may be blind to the facts and 
circumstances outside of this short-term perspective. By contrast, if the or-
ganization is structured to reward long-term professional values in addition 
to short-term expediency, the individual will be more likely to focus on pro-
fessional responsibilities as well as organizational aims. 
Opportunities for verification of professional identity should be on-
going; it is not enough to integrate the professional into a larger organiza-
tional group. If the professional is to maintain a "professional" identity that 
is distinct from the "organizational" identity, there must be group members 
who can provide opportunities for self-verification of that identity. As one 
researcher has noted, "[w]hen groups were not available to reaffirm old 
80 See also M. Gregg Bloche, Caretakers and Collaborators, lO CAMBRIDGE Q. 
HEALTHCARE En-nes 275,278 (2001) (explaining the need for professional autonomy). 
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role-identities, those identities withered and decreased in salience. "81 By 
contrast, when the organization provides opportunities for individuals to 
verify multiple identities, both personal well-being and organizational effec-
tiveness are enhanced: the organization is better able to adapt to changing 
conditions, and the individual fmds support for "fulfilling the expectations" 
of both identities. 82 
Creating opportunities for self-verification of the professional iden-
tity requires that the organization openly encourage and reward behavior 
consistent with professional norms-even when that behavior might not be 
in the interest of organizational expediency. Thus, lawyers .who advise the 
organization that desired actions do not comply with the law, physicians 
who insist on proper medical care for prisoners, and chaplains who provide 
religious support for detainees should be recognized for their professional 
success-not merely tolerated, and certainly not discouraged. Such encou-
ragement need not take the form of financial or material incentive; what is 
most needed in this context is simply affirmation. Professionals who do 
their jobs-and do them well, even when the requirements of those jobs 
may not comport with organizational expediency-should be openly ac-
knowledged. 
Moreover, organizational leaders should make it clear that such pro-
fessional conduct is not at odds with military service. As noted earlier, per-
sons with dual identities are put in a difficult situation if they can verify 
only one of two competing identities. However, when the same action is 
able to verify both identities together, this harmonization makes it more 
likely that that the individual will act in accordance with both identities, 
rather than sublimating the less salient identity. Military leaders should 
make it clear, then, that good legal advice-even if not organizationally 
expedient-is part of being both a good professional and a good military 
officer. 
Finally, professional organizations themselves can play a role in 
enhancing the professional identity of dual-professionals in organizational 
settings. Specifically, such organizations should reach out to their military 
members, making an effort to include them in the profession more broadly. 
This action could have two effects. First, as noted above, it would increase 
the individuals' connection to their professional community, thus reinforc-
ing the salience of the professional identity. Second, however, it may also 
guard against the negative effects that would ensue if military professionals 
felt rejected by their larger communities; recent research has suggested that 
81 Lynn Smith-Lovin, The Strength of Weak Identities: Social Structural Sources of Self, 
Situation and Emotional Experience, 70 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 106, 108 (2007). 
82 Amara T. Brook, Julie Garcia, and Monique Fleming, The Effects of Multiple Identities 
on Psychological Well-Being, 34 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1588, 1598 (2008). 
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professional identity could be diminished if professional organizations are 
viewed as rejecting these individuals from inclusion in the group. 83 
Thus, professional groups should tread extremely carefully in situa-
tions that could be seen as marginalizing those with dual identities. When 
the American Psychological Association considered a resolution that would 
have prohibited psychologists from participating in interrogations entirely, 
Colonel Larry James cautioned that this action could discourage military 
psychologists, arguing that "those young psychologists are going to feel as 
though we've abandoned them, and they need our support right now."84 
Similar reactions can also occur when military professionals face sanctions 
by outside professional entities. 85 While there may be valid reasons to take 
such actions, professional licensing bodies should be careful in' doing so, 
minimizing rhetoric of marginalization or unwelcomeness; the organizations 
should clarify that while certain actions may be incompatible with profes-
sional duties, military service in and of itself is in no way inconsistent with 
professional norms. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In recent years, professionals in the military have suffered criticism 
for their failure to counter military excess-especially in the area of torture 
and maltreatment of detainees. While much of the criticism leveled against 
such professionals has assumed that these professionals were making a con-
scious choice to avoid the strictures of their code of ethics, this Article of-
fers a different view. 
This Article applies identity theory to offer a situationist explana-
tion. It argues that some of the professional failures arise from the C()gnitive 
incentives faced by competing professional identities in an organization that 
rewards organizational deference over independent professional advice. 
Medical, legal, and other professionals in large organizations must deal with 
two competing identities--one tied to their profession, and one tied to the 
83 
See, e.g., Constantina Bedea, et al., Negotiating Dual Identities: The Impact of Group-
Based Rejection on Identification and Acculturation, EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. (2011), availa-
ble at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/1 0.1002/ejsp. 786/full (finding that for immigrants, 
"perceived rejection from the country of origin (can be] more in3portant than the rejection by 
~e new country into which one has moved"; rejection from the origin group lessens motiva-
tion to maintain the original ethnic identity). This conclusion is ''[i]n line with jdentity 
change research," and therefore may carry over to identity formation and retention generally. 
Id at 9. 
84 
Military Psychologists Face Complaints with Licensing Boards over Roles at 
Guantdnamo, DEMOCRACY Now, http://www.democracynow.org/20 I 0/7/8/military _ 
pyschologists_face _complaints_ with _licensing (July 8, 20 10). 
85 
See id (noting that professional complaints have been filed against two psychologists 
who participated in interrogations). 
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organization. Identity theory predicts that when both identities are activated, 
individuals are more likely to act in accordance with the more salient identi-
ty. For professionals involved in military operations, this has led to a recent 
spate of professional failures-professionals gave advice and counsel that 
subordinated their professional role to their organizational role, and failed to 
check military excess. 
The situation can be managed in ways that are likely to increase the 
salience of individuals' professional identity, making it more likely that the 
professional identity will guide behavior. Orgaillzational managers can do 
two things to reduce the likelihood of such failures. First, they can structure 
situational influences in ways that increase the salience of individuals' pro-
fessional identity in relation to their organizational identity. Second, manag-
ers can create situational opportunities for individuals to obtain self-
verification of their professional identity without sacrificing organizational 
status. Finally, professional organizations themselves can reach out to these 
dual professionals, avoiding rhetoric of marginalization or rejection and 
affirming their importance to the profession as a whole. 
